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ABSTRACT 
After more than two decades of inflation targeting in the world, it is important to evaluate if the 
adoption of this regime in a relevant developing country contributed to the creation of a better 
environment for the process of entrepreneurs' expectations formation. Brazil is part of an 
important group of developing countries and represents a potential laboratory experiment in which 
the effects of an adoption of inflation targeting after more than a decade can be evaluated. Not 
enough is known about the consequences of inflation targeting credibility on both monetary policy 
and monetary policy transmission channels in developing countries that adopted inflation 
targeting. Emphasizing the role of transparency and the credibility of monetary policy as a 
performance criterion that motivate any country wishing to adopt an inflation targeting regime, 
this study leads to the fact that these two basic principles toward which a inflation targeting regime 
cannot be achieved without respect for certain pre namely institutional and technical conditions. 
© 2015 Pak Publishing Group. All Rights Reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of monetary policy seems to have been, during the last fifteen years, a recasting of 
these old concepts and the emergence of new bases dictated by the emergence of the concept of 
active monetary rule centered on the dominance of goal "inflation targeting."  
Conduct based on the concept of monetary policy rules is in line with the work on the problem 
of time inconsistency "time inconsistency" developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977). These latter 
rather prefer notion of rules, they oppose discretionary decisions. This paradox is summed up in the 
maxim: "rule against discretion."  
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This reasoning has been applied, a few years later, and by Barro and Gordon (1983). Using a 
Phillips curve incorporating the hypothesis of rational expectations on the model (Lucas, 1972), 
these authors conclude that discretionary use of monetary policy in violation of the existing rule 
would certainly be hampered by reactions of economic agents and actually produce the opposite 
effect to that intended. In other words, in the presence of asymmetric preferences, the monetary 
authorities end up systematically produce an inflationary bias and cause "inflation surprises".  
In the same, and in order to complete the contradictions "rule-discretion", "flexibility-rigidity", 
recent research on the conduct of monetary policy has led to the emergence of the rule of Taylor 
(1993) is the best-known expression. And instead devoted to the concept of optimal rule in the 
conduct of monetary policy is justified by the criteria of credibility and transparency in a context 
where structural changes occur continuously and / or the central bank is uncertain about the true 
structure of the economy. J. Taylor rule as the beginning of the active rules, owes its popularity to 
further theoretical clarifications by including (Svensson, 1999). The latter has the Taylor rule as a 
special case of stabilizing the inflation target, this target is not completed or a desire to stabilize 
cyclical activity ("strict" versus "flexible inflation targeting" ). These theoretical studies are 
supported by a large empirical literature to identify the exact forms of optimal rules to prove their 
normative properties. Explicit inflation targeting as an alternative nominal anchor for monetary 
policy, perfectly embodies the attitude of "looking forward" based on the construction of an 
inflation forecast that emanates from a global structural model. On the operational point of view, 
this translates into an inclusive approach to all the information available. In practical terms, this 
revival in the conduct of monetary policy has become a monetary policy increasingly popular and 
is now a global trend with twenty five countries targeting inflation (eight developed and emerging 
seventeen). Faced with these developments, it became useful and constructive to focus on the study 
of a new framework for monetary policy is inflation targeting.  
This work focuses on evaluating the experience of emerging countries that have adopted 
inflation targeting since the 1990s, is also focusing much on performance as the potential benefits 
and costs of adoption such a monetary policy framework and try to learn from twenty years of 
practice this plan. We present in this work the analysis of the policy of inflation targeting 
framework, the definition of this regime and its strategic choices. Special attention is given to the 
transparency and credibility of monetary policy as a performance criterion that motivates any 
country wishing to adopt an inflation targeting regime. 
Hence, the main contribution of this study is the presentation of empirical evidence for the 
influence of credibility on monetary policy and, as a consequence, for the transmission of monetary 
policy to the economy through the traditional channels (the interest rate channel, the credit channel, 
the exchange rate channel, the asset prices channel and the expectations channel), with emphasis on 
the expectations channel, after the adoption of inflation targeting in Brazil. 
For this purpose, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the relation between 
credibility and monetary policy conduction. Section 3 provides empirical evidence about the 
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monetary policy transmission mechanisms for the Brazilian economy. Section 4 concludes the 
paper 
 
2. CREDIBILITY AND THE TRANSMISSION CHANNELS OF MONETARY 
POLICY THAT AFFECT INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 
The theory of inflation targeting began with Leiderman and Svensson (1995), Svensson (1997; 
1998; 1999), Bernanke et al. (1999). With these authors  the first definitions of the targeting policy have 
emerged. The first work appeared,  during the years ninety, show some differences in the definition of  
policy of inflation targeting. The definition that we develop is similar to that of  Bernanke (2010). 
Indeed, we consider inflation targeting as a monetary policy analysis framework and not as a simple rule 
for action on inflation. In other words, its primary objective is to maintain price stability without 
excluding the autonomy of monetary authorities to pursue other secondary objectives such as stability of 
economic activity,  the stability of the exchange rate. It is based on a digital ad spot with or without 
tolerance interval. Inflation targeting is to anchor inflation expectations. This goal is possible only when 
economic agents rely on policy makers in the actions taken to achieve the predefined objectives. Thus, 
the central bank must have both a system of relevant forecasting and communication system providing a 
level of transparency and high credibility.According to this definition the success of inflation targeting 
based on compliance with certain institutional forms and strategic choices, because monetary policy 
does not directly affect the performance of the policies of macroeconomic variables such as 
employment, output and inflation. Monetary policy is first on the decisions of economic agents and the 
transmission of different channels. However, do not know enough about the consequences of the 
credibility of the inflation targeting monetary policy and the transmission of monetary policy to the 
economy of developing countries that have adopted inflation targeting. In this sense, some important 
issues are raised. Credibility is he important to the creation of a more stable macroeconomic 
environment, able to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy and stimulate investment in the 
economy? Expectations of entrepreneurs do they play an important role as a channel of transmission and 
expectations are they affected by other mechanisms of transmission?  
Credibility can be defined as the degree of private sector confidence in the ability and determination 
to follow the central bank monetary policy and achieve the goals it has announced, despite temporary 
deviations that could make to absorb shocks to the economy. 
Come we have seen since the seminal work Kydland and Prescott (1977), credibility plays a key 
role in the conduct of monetary policy. Therefore, a policy is credible when the public believes in the 
rule / strategy and through expectations about the results that the monetary authority seeks to achieve. 
When expectations are regarded as an important channel of monetary transmission, lack of credibility 
may impede the scope of a goal because the expectations are formed in a context of mistrust. Under 
inflation targeting, for example, expectations and credibility are critical to the success of monetary 
policy. de Mendonça (2009) found evidence that the credibility is an important element responsible for 
the process of disinflation in Brazil, after the adoption of inflation targeting. With slight fluctuations in 
interest rates, due to greater credibility, investment decisions are made with more confidence, leading to 
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a more robust process of job creation.  
Work and de Mendonça and Lima (2011) presents a study of empirical analysis by the method of 
generalized to find the macroeconomic determinants of investment under inflation targeting in Brazil 
times. The period covered by the analysis from January 2000 until September 2009. The work tests the 
influence of real GDP in interest rates, credit, inflation, exchange rate, public debt and credibility on 
private investment. According to them, it is expected that there is a positive relationship between the 
credibility and investment. In particular, the effect on private investment increased credibility of inflation 
targeting is positive and statistically significant. Increased credibility increases capacity planning due to 
the lower uncertainty in the economy and the concomitant increase in investment. In short, the success 
of inflation targeting in the Brazilian economy is an important mechanism for promoting private 
investment, namely, the work has found that the success of inflation targeting creates a stable 
macroeconomic environment that fosters private investment.  
Under inflation targeting, the effectiveness of monetary policy is a function of the transmission 
channels of monetary policy. According to Mukherjee and Bhattacharya (2011), the literature to date 
highlights four main transmission channels: the traditional interest rate channel supply credit or a loan, 
the exchange rate channel and the price channel of assets. However, in most of the economic crisis, 
decisions are made under uncertainty and therefore are guided by expectations. Investment decisions, for 
example, that entrepreneurs should take, are often based on various expectations regarding different 
aspects, such as the influence of economic policies and the state of the economy on their business.  
Four transmission channels can be recognized the effect of monetary policy on the economy (Fig 1) 
: the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, the credit channel and the channel asset prices.  
 
 
Fig-1. Credibility and transmission channels of monetary policy 
 
Under inflation targeting, changes in the short-term interest rate depends on the credibility of the 
scheme and affect investment decisions (and therefore employment) through a large set of variables, 
including the real cost of capital, credit, exchange rate, wealth and expectations of entrepreneurs.  
The channel is derived from the standard Keynesian theory of traditional interest rates. The basic 
assumption is that prices are rigid and adapt to a monetary shock with a delay. Thus, adjustments to the 
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nominal lead policy of short-term interest rates to changes in the real interest rate in the short term. 
Fluctuations in real interest rates influence the decisions of economic agents. Specifically, changes in the 
cost of capital affect corporate investment decisions.  
Thus, it is expected that when the real interest rate increases the cost of capital is high, which 
reduces investment. Besides, when the real interest rate increases and becomes more volatile, the 
expectations of entrepreneurs deteriorate, the postponement of investment decisions.  
Regarding the credit channel, it can be divided into two different channels, the bank lending channel 
and the balance sheet channel. For the bank lending channel, a more restrictive monetary policy usually 
leads to reduce deposits in commercial banks through its impact on economic activity. These factors 
reduce the availability of bank loans available for businesses, which negatively affects investment 
decisions.  
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy through the credit channel for the period of 
inflation targeting in Brazil has been approached by several empirical studies (Catão et al., 2008; Catão 
and Pagan, 2009; Coelho et al., 2010; de Mello and Pisu, 2010; Auel and De Mendonça, 2011). Among 
these studies, the work of Auel and De Mendonça (2011) found substantial evidence and should be 
highlighted.  
Auel and De Mendonça (2011) analyzes the macroeconomic relevance of the credit channel in 
Brazil. Based on data from 2002 to 2009, three sets of GMM models are considered as a model of GMM 
system is constructed and a VAR analysis is made. The results indicate that the effects of economic 
shocks on the supply of credit and the credit spread are consistent with the theory of the credit channel.  
Moreover, we observe that the impact on the interest rate are not transmitted directly to the 
economy, but through the channels of credit. Regarding the functioning of credit channels for monetary 
policy, the work of Auel and De Mendonça (2011)  points out that the empirical evidence for emerging 
economies is rare.  
Regarding the exchange rate channel in the case of an emerging market economy with a system of 
flexible exchange rates, the precise impact of monetary policy on exchange rates is uncertain and will 
depend on expectations domestic and foreign interest rates, inflation and government debt. Economists 
generally assume also true that high domestic interest rates lead to an appreciation of the currency. 
However, under certain conditions, higher interest rates cannot make the most attractive currency. 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) show how rising interest rates may cause an increase in expected inflation if 
households expect the debt will eventually be monetized. Blanchard (2005) studied the case of Brazil 
and argued that for high levels of debt and risk premiums, higher interest rates may trigger currency 
depreciations. In the model Akemann and Kanczuk (2005), the effect of tightening monetary policy 
causes a depreciation of the currency when interest rates and debt levels are quite high.  
Regarding the influence of the exchange rate on investment, it is expected that an appreciation of 
the exchange rate has a positive effect on investment. The explanation is simple: if the domestic 
producer relies on imported inputs in production and investment, an appreciation of the exchange rate 
implies a reduction in the marginal cost of production, which could lead to an expansion of the 
investment activity. For the asset price channel, two channels are often emphasized in studies on 
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monetary transmission channels. These involve Tobin's q theory of investment and wealth effects on 
consumption. Tobin q theory provides an explanation on how monetary policy affects the economy 
through its effect on the valuation of shares. Tobin (1969) defines q as the market value of firms divided 
by the replacement cost of capital.  
q = Market value of the company / replacement value of fixed capital  
  If q is high, the market price of firms is high relative to the replacement cost of capital and new 
capital equipment factory cheaper compared to the market value of companies. Companies can then 
issue shares and obtain a high relative to the cost of installation and equipment they purchase price. 
Thus, investment spending will increase because companies can buy a lot of new investment products. 
Thus, monetary policy can affect the share price increase (decrease) of the basic interest rate, making the 
bonds more (less) attractive relative to stocks, causing stock prices to fall (increase). Consequently, the 
price decline participation (increase) led to a decrease (increase) in q, and thus decrease (increase) 
investment spending. An alternative route for the transmission of monetary policy through asset prices is 
the wealth effect on consumption channel. It was built on the model of the life cycle consumption 
developed by Ando and Modigliani (1963), in which household wealth is an important determinant of 
consumer spending. The connection to monetary policy comes through the link between interest rates 
and asset prices, for example, stock prices increase because the central bank has reduced interest rates, 
households owning shares become richer and may elect to increase their consumption. Conversely, when 
stock prices fall, households can reduce consumption. It is important to note that the asset price channel 
by the wealth effect is relevant for countries like the United States and England.  
However, in the case of the Brazilian economy, for example, consumer participation in the stock 
market is negligible, which makes the transmission mechanism of little importance in Brazil (Tomazzia 
and Meurer, 2009). According to Mishkin (2007), "Fluctuations in the stock market, which are 
influenced by monetary policy, have a significant impact on the overall economy. Transmission 
mechanisms involving the stock market are of three types: the effects of stock market investments, 
wealth effects and household liquidity. "In addition, the credibility of inflation targeting positively affects 
the expectations of entrepreneurs as it reflects monetary stability, which is crucial for creating a 
favorable business environment. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Given the history of Brazil, the threat of inflation is very likely, then the central bank expected 
inflation of between 30 and 80% and a GDP contraction of (-3 to -6%) in 1999.  A first decision 
should be made: to return to a fixed or given parity, or continue to float the real. Monetary 
authorities have opted to maintain the floating, but it was not therefore find nominal anchor a new 
point. Targeting a monetary aggregate seemed unrealistic given the uncertainties surrounding this 
latest crisis. The alternative was to conduct a fully discretionary policy without explicit anchor. But 
the environment in which bathed the economy has raised his hand a firmer and transparent 
engagement. Ultimately, the choice of monetary policy has focused on inflation targeting. A multi-
year goal was decided by providing an inflation rate of 8% for 1999, 6% for 2000 and 4% in 2001, 
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with a threshold of tolerance was set to ± 2%. These objectives represent the median of the target 
area. The latter is set at 3.5-5.5% in 2013. In March 1999, Brazil announced a target to reduce 
inflation to less than 10% in the fourth quarter of 1999 before moving to the establishment of a 
comprehensive system of inflation targeting for the end of June in 1999. 
There is empirical evidence about the impact of inflation targeting credibility on short-term 
interest rates in Brazil, which suggest that when the credibility of the regime of inflation targeting 
increases, the level and volatility of the basic interest rate decrease (de Mendonça, 2007a; de 
Mendonça and de Guimarães e Souza, 2009). Moreover, there is evidence that successful inflation 
targeting creates a stable macroeconomic environment that promotes private investment (de 
Mendonça and Lima, 2011) In the present study, the period of analysis runs from 2001Q4 to 
2013Q4 (the justification for using this period is because the market expectations series available 
from the Central Bank of Brazil started in the last quarter of 2001). Due to the fact that ―Industrial    
entrepreneur confidence index‖ and ―investment‖ are quarterly series; the analysis is done with 
quarterly data. The (quarterly) series used are: • Selic interest rate (Selic) • Real interest rate 
(real_ir) Exchange rate (exch_rate) • Credit as a proportion of GDP (credit_gdp) • Value of 
companies listed at Bovespa (vc_bovespa) • Investment (gfcf) • Ratio between employed people 
and economically active population (empl_eap) • Industrial entrepreneur confidence index (IECI) 
• Inflation targeting credibility (CI): The measure of credibility is based on the index developed by 
de Mendonça (2007a). The credibility index has a value equal to 1 when the annual expected inflation 
(E(π)) is equal to the inflation target and decreases in a linear way while inflationary expectation deviates 
from the announced target. Therefore, the credibility index shows a value between 0 and 1 strictly if the 
expected inflation is situated between the maximum and minimum limits (𝜋𝑡
∗) established for each year 
and assumes a value equal to 0 when the expected inflation exceeds one of these limits. The index uses 
the series of inflation expectations obtained from the CBB site and, the inflation target defined by the 
monetary authority and the tolerance bands. Hence, 
CI= {
                         1                                  𝐼𝑓 𝐸(𝜋) = 𝜋𝑡
                              1 −
1
𝜋t   − 
∗ 𝜋t
[E(𝜋) − 𝜋t]            𝐼𝑓 𝜋𝑡 min 
∗ < 𝐸(𝜋) < 𝜋𝑡 max 
∗  
                                            0              𝐼𝑓 𝐸(𝜋) ≥ 𝜋𝑡 max 
∗ 𝑜𝑟 𝐸(𝜋) ≤ 𝜋𝑡 min 
∗
 
Although different indexes of credibility have been proposed – as summarized in the works of de 
Mendonça and de Guimarães e Souza (2009), Nahon and Meurer (2009) and Guillén and Gracia-Canal 
(2009) and therefore there is a variety of indexes of credibility capable of being used in empirical 
analyses, the present work does not seek to analyze the influence and power of each index on monetary 
policy in Brazil – although such research is important. Thus, the option for using the index proposed by 
de Mendonça (2007a) is due to the following arguments: (i) the index is recognized by international 
literature, being this index used in several applied studies, (ii) simplicity of understanding and 
preparation, (iii) the index captures the changes and fluctuations in credibility in a way compatible with 
the regime of inflation targeting adopted in Brazil, i.e., the index uses predetermined tolerance bands, 
and not ad-hoc tolerance bands as proposed by other indices, and (iv) the index is rigorous enough and 
punishes appropriately deviations of inflation expectations in relation to the inflation target. 
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Considering the period of the analysis, Table 1 below presents the correlations between the 
variables of the analysis. Fig. 2 presents the macroeconomic evolution variables of the Brazilian 
economics. 
 
Table-1. Correlation. 
Variables   CI 
CI   1.00 
SELIC  −0.41 
Variables SELIC 
SELIC  0.98 
REAL_IR  0.72 
IECI  −0.48 
CREDIT_GDP  −0.82 
EXCH_RATE  0.79 
VC_BOVESPA  −0.78 
Variables  GFCF 
GFCF  0.99 
REAL_IR  −0.77 
IECI  0.49 
CREDIT_GDP 0.94 
EXCH_RATE  −0.86 
VC_BOVESPA  0.96 
Variables  EMPL_EAP 
EMPL_EAP  0.99 
GFCF  0.96 
 
        CI                                                          SELIC                                         REAL-IR     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        IECI                                                CREDIT-GDP                               EXCH- RATE 
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                VC_BOVESPA                                  GFCF                                             EMPL_EAP 
 
Fig-2. Macroeconomic variables.           
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The theory of monetary policy seems to have been, during the last fifteen years, a recasting of 
these old concepts and the emergence of new bases dictated by the emergence of the concept of 
active monetary rule centered on the dominance of goal "inflation targeting."  
Conduct based on the concept of monetary policy rules is in line with the work on the problem 
of time inconsistency "time inconsistency" developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) .These latter 
rather prefer notion of rules, they oppose discretionary decisions. This paradox is summed up in the 
maxim: "rule against discretion."  
This reasoning has been applied, a few years later, and by Barro and Gordon (1983) monetary 
policy. Using a Phillips curve incorporating the hypothesis of rational expectations on the model 
Lucas (1972), these authors conclude that discretionary use of monetary policy in violation of the 
existing rule would certainly be hampered by reactions of economic agents and actually produce 
the opposite effect to that intended. In other words, in the presence of asymmetric preferences, the 
monetary authorities end up systematically produce an inflationary bias and cause "inflation 
surprises".  
In the same vein, and in order to complete the contradictions "rule-discretion", "flexibility-
rigidity", recent research on the conduct of monetary policy has led to the emergence of the rule of 
Taylor (1993) is the best-known expression. And instead devoted to the concept of optimal rule in 
the conduct of monetary policy is justified by the criteria of credibility and transparency in a 
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context where structural changes occur continuously and / or the central bank is uncertain about the 
true structure of the economy.  
These theoretical studies are supported by a large empirical literature to identify the exact 
forms of optimal rules to prove their normative properties.  Explicit inflation targeting as an 
alternative nominal anchor for monetary policy, perfectly embodies the attitude of "looking 
forward" based on the construction of an inflation forecast that emanates from a global structural 
model. On the operational point of view, this translates into an inclusive approach to all the 
information available.  
In practical terms, this revival in the conduct of monetary policy has become a monetary policy 
increasingly popular and is now a global trend with twenty five countries targeting inflation (eight 
developed and emerging seventeen).  
Faced with these developments, it became useful and constructive to focus on the study of a 
new framework for monetary policy is inflation targeting.  
This work focuses on evaluating the experience of emerging countries that have adopted 
inflation targeting since the 1990s, is also focusing much on performance as the potential benefits 
and costs of adoption such a monetary policy framework and try to learn from twenty years of 
practice this plan.  
This paper treats the inflation targeting policy and the rule of conduct and the study of 
efficiency and economic performance of inflation targeting.  
We present in this work the analysis of the policy of inflation targeting framework, the 
definition of this regime and its strategic choices. Special attention is given to the transparency and 
credibility of monetary policy as a performance criterion that motivates any country wishing to 
adopt an inflation targeting regime.  
monetary authorities. Because not only inflation targeting avoids the bias  inflationary, but it 
also relates to measures against the problem of credibility from the construction and combines 
ways to improve the degree of credibility. For example, inflation targeting requires institutional 
reform in countries adopting this policy. For example, these countries must have an independent 
Central Bank, so these countries already encourage the decline in the inflation rate. In addition, 
these countries must ensure financial discipline in order to adopt this policy. So the monetization of 
government debt by the central bank is avoided and the public debt is restructured. On the other 
hand, inflation targeting can be seen as a model of reputation first, because one of its properties is 
the fact that the target inflation rate is announced to the public at the beginning of each period and 
by this announcement, the Central Bank is committed to respecting this announcement and to 
reduce the inflation rate to target rate  and announced. From this point of view, the target rate can 
be considered as a rule of economic policy that the monetary authority must respect. Also, it is a 
monetary policy that requires some transparency where private and asymmetric information is a 
minimum. As part of this policy, the Central Bank shall inform the public through the regular 
publication of various reports and even the publication of inflation forecasts that can be considered 
as a signal to private agents. 
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